NIC-based intrusion detection: A feasibility study Srinivasan Parthasarathy
NIC-based intrusion detection: A feasibility study Srinivasan Parthasarathy Ohio State University Joint work with M. Otey, R. Noronha, G. Li and D.Panda Roadmap Motivation and Approaches Challenges and Objectives Preliminary Work Algorithms Experimental Results
Conclusions Motivation LAN WAN LAN Conventional Security Setup
WAN Adding NIC-based security Legend Host (+ host-based security) Firewall NIC-based Intrusion Detection System Why NIC-based Intrusion Detection
Pros Better Coverage and Scalability More security end points Better Reliability and Performance Host is separate from NIC Adaptable, Flexible and Dynamic Intrusion patterns/rules can be modified on the fly so that the ID scheme can adapt. Possible Cons Efficiency and Performance of Network Messaging
Solution Simple yet effective schemes are needed Coverage and Scalability One-to-one mapping between NICs and hosts coverage Natural distribution of computation scalability Less aggregation Can detect more specific intrusions E.g. a firewall can detect host scans, a NIC is better positioned to track port scans. Can detect intrusion internal to a LAN Conventional setup cannot
Cooperating NICs can potentially detect more complex exploits Reliability and Performance Independence from host adds to reliability One extra security layer If host is contaminated NIC-security may still be activated If NIC is contaminated or detects an intrusion the host will still be secure Independence from host can improve performance Host OS is not frequently interrupted, can do other stuff If host is loaded, bandwidth not impacted as much.
Challenges Building specialized NIC hardware may be too expensive Our objective: work with commodity NICs Resources on commodity NICs are limited Smaller memory, slower processor Efficiency on basic actions (message transfers) a crucial concern Impact of ID schemes on bandwidth of good messages
Is NIC-based intrusion detection feasible? Objectives of this study Design some simple algorithms for intrusion detection that are: Efficient Utilize limited resources Evaluation Criteria Detection Accuracy Efficiency
Roadmap Motivation and Approaches Challenges and Objectives Preliminary Work Algorithms Experimental Results Conclusions Basic Algorithms Port Scan Detector (PSD) Anomaly Detector
Instantiation of Anomalous Client Detector Signature Detector Nave Bayesian Classifier Sample Instantiation LAN WAN Adding NIC-based security NIC-based Anomalous Client Detector
Legend Host + host-based security Firewall NIC-based Port Scan Detector NIC-based Nave Bayes Classifier Port Scan Detector Is memory constrained? No
One port, one bit 8KBKB Yes Length of bit vector = B Many (65536) to one (B) mapping f from ports to bits (biased mapping possible) Is one bit vector enough? Difficult to refresh (lose all previous information), may not detect slow scans Sliding window N such vectors P = max # of packets per vector (reuse rate)
How to combine? OR all bit vectors (low computational cost) How often to check and how to detect? F = Detection Frequency S = Threshold for port scan (# of 1s) Anomalous Client Detector Goal: Detect anomalous behavior E.g. Is this particular srcdest packet typical? Estimate P(srcIP|destIP) [chan02]
Is P(srcIP|destIP) > threshold? If yes, then detect normal If no, then detect anomaly Implementation Relies on hash tables Complete srcIP not modeled (only at the subnet level) Moderate/high memory utilization, low computational cost Anomalous Client Detector (contd.) Threshold Dynamic, functionally dependent on destIP
Must aid in discriminating amongst different levels of anomalous behavior E.g. A new client accessing web portal is less surprising than a new client accessing an internal machine We can use entropy to model this! Entropy of internal machine will be low. Entropy of external machine will be high. Extensions Non-stationary model (similar to port-scan detector) Can compare changes to P(srcIP|destIP) over time Nave Bayes Packet Classifier
Simplified Nave Bayes Classifier trained to identify the signature of seven different artificial intrusions. 6 features explicit in the packet header Protocol type, Protocol Flags, SrcPort, DestPort, SrcIP, DestPort (may be implicit), 1 derived feature E.g. # connections in last X seconds, average deviation of TTL Implementation details Relatively high computational requirements
Roadmap Motivation and Approaches Challenges and Objectives Preliminary Work Algorithms Experimental Results Conclusions Experimental Results Hardware Configuration 300 Mhz Pentium II, 128KB MB memory 66 Mhz LANai 4 processor NIC, 1MB memory
Software Synthetic datasets (described in paper) Training-Testing data split (standard) Results: Resource Requirements Effect of Host Load on Bandwidth Results: Port Scan Detector Results: Anomalous Client Detector
DARPA dataset 1 week attack-free data 1 week test data Only external tcp dump 13 million packets Detects 11/43 attacks
Synthetic dataset qualitative performance summary Some spread over several packets Clustering alarms reduces false alarm rate Misses 32/43 attacks Uses only external TCP dump Several not detectable from just IP
Good Bad Good 8KB9948KB6 0 Bad 790 99724 Typical Confusion Matrix Results: Nave Bayes Classifier Good Bad Good 105118KB 0
Bad 67545 8KB27337 Typical Confusion Matrix Roadmap Motivation and Approaches Challenges and Objectives Preliminary Work Algorithms
Experimental Results Conclusions Related Work Intrusion detection Ton of recent work in this area Anomaly detection [Forrest 97, Chan 02] Signature detection, e.g. SNORT/BRO Hybrid strategies [Barbara et al 2001/2002] NIC based computing support Fast synchronization support [Panda 01]
Fast support for application messaging [Bershad 98KB] NIC based security Self securing devices [Ganger 2001,2002] Firewall security 3Com embedded firewall  Current and Future Work Testing using real data (DARPA/NETFLOW) Port system to other NICs Faster Myrinet cards Effect of multiple processors per NIC Quadrics
New detectors/algorithms? Effect of multiple detectors per NIC Distributed NIC-based ID schemes Combining NIC+Host based schemes Potentially lose out on some reliability at a gain of better techniques Conclusions NIC-based intrusion detection can potentially be a
useful addition to the overall network security system. Potentially impact Coverage, Scalability, Reliability, Performance, Flexibility Technological outlook looks good Multiprocessor NICs (Quadrics), 1Ghz NICs (soon) Preliminary results support argument However, there is a long way to go! Questions?
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